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Abstract. Risks are an essential feature of future climate change impacts. We explore 
whether knowledge that climate change might be the source of increasing pine beetle 
impacts on public or private forests affects stated risk estimates of damage, elicited using 
the Exchangeability Method. We find that across subjects the difference between public 
and private forest status does not influence stated risks, but the group told that global 
warming is the cause of pine beetle damage have significantly higher risk perceptions 
than the group not given this information. 
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Does Climate Change Information Affect Stated Risks of Pine Beetle Impacts on 
Forests?  An Application of the Exchangeability Method 
 
1. Introduction 
In a recent paper Bulte et al. (2005) consider the role that outrage and moral 
responsibility have in the determination of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce 
negative environmental outcomes, using a field experiment. They find that the WTP to 
protect seals relates to the nature or cause of the threat to the seals. Similarly, here we are 
interested in knowing whether the nature of the threat to forests matters, not in the 
determination of an individual’s WTP, but in the formation of risk perceptions of forest 
damage. In particular, we want to understand whether explicitly framing climate change 
as the source of the pine beetle infestation affect laypersons’ perceptions. 
 We use laboratory experiments to explore whether specifically stating the 
essential cause of an environmental outcome matters in eliciting subjective environmental 
risks. The cause of interest is global warming and the risky outcome we consider is future 
pine beetle destruction of private or public forests. Climate change may increase the 
destructive capability of the pine beetle, which attacks pine forests in several places in the 
United States, including the state of Texas. Given scientific controversy about risks 
related to climate change, public support for mitigation and adaptation policies on 
forestry sector can be strongly influenced by laypeople’s assessments or perceptions 
about those risks (Leiserowitz 2005).  
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) uses the word “risk” to 
characterize a possible range of outcomes related to climate change, and these risks 
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themselves may be uncertain. In particular, risk is a combination of probability of an 
event and the severity of the event, given it occurs. Knowing the probability is essential if 
an economist wishes to use the common economic framework to assess risky choices or 
options, which is the expected utility model (EU). 
Even the most basic element of climate change, the average temperature that may 
occur at a particular date, is typically described using a range, rather than a point estimate, 
and competing models of global circulation assign different probabilities to these ranges, 
as well as other outcomes such as sea level rise. If the experts in the science community 
cannot pinpoint estimates of the probabilities that characterize the risks of climate change, 
then the public might be expected to form their own opinions about them. Perhaps this is 
why some individuals in the public seem certain that global warming is already 
happening, and others seem certain it is not and never will (e.g., Bostrom et al. 1994; 
Leiserowitz 2005; 2006; Weber 2006).  
If subjective probabilities can be formulated , then the subjective expected utility 
framework (SEU) can be substituted for the EU framework. However, we note that the 
SEU framework most often assumes that individuals collapse their uncertainty into a 
degenerate expected value, ultimately thus being a risk framework and not one of 
uncertainty (Riddel 2011 makes this point). All of this makes it of great interest to 
ascertain subjective estimates of risk in the case of global warming impacts. 
Our main application here relates to an approach to risk elicitation. Methods for 
uncovering subjective probability estimates vary from the most simple approach one 
could imagine (just ask) to more complicated approaches, such as the one we use here, 
called the Exchangeability Method (EM). While risk elicitation is common in decision 
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analysis, particularly for studies of financial risk and uncertainty economics, it is much 
less used in the context of environmental and resource economics. Probability or risk 
elicitation here should not be confused with elicitation of risk preferences, wherein some 
method is used to determine an individual’s level of aversion to risk, which is most often 
related to decisions involving tradeoffs and financial outcomes. Risk preference studies 
do not directly allow recovery of the individual’s estimate of the probability of an 
outcome, though coefficients of risk aversion can be recovered from the data and used to 
estimate EU models that correspond to particular functional forms of risk aversion, such 
as the popular Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) form. 
Much like elicitation of values, a risk elicitation mechanism guarantees reliable 
risk estimates if it provides subjects with some type of an incentive to state their real 
beliefs or preferences (e.g. see Vossler and Evans, 2009). Despite many kinds of 
incentives that may accomplish this,  many economists take the view that only monetary 
incentives can succeed in ensuring incentive compatibility. This discussion has largely 
been in the domain of experimental economics, conducted in the laboratory. For example, 
the probability scoring method has been implemented as an incentive compatible 
approach to eliciting probabilities, when the gambles can be easily played out. Again, 
these are  typically going to involve  simple financial lotteries or gambles (see Savage 
1971; Karni 2009). However, many economic studies, as well as laboratory studies in 
psychology involve hypothetical choices or scenarios, as ours does here (see Manski, 
2004). 
The problem in the context here is one that will nearly always be encountered 
when the outcomes are large scale environmental outcomes, or health outcomes, for the 
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simple reason that these cannot be played out in the laboratory. In part to address this 
issue, Fiore et al. (2009) set up a virtual reality experiment involving forest fires, which 
are a clear-cut example of something that cannot be played out in the laboratory. The 
outcomes are instead played out in the virtual world, which is supposed to more closely 
mimic the real world that simple picture or verbal text. Subjects see the fire using virtual 
reality devices, but of course cannot feel the heat, nor do they actually own property that 
may be destroyed by the forest fire. Fiore et al. (2009) do not attempt to elicit individual’s 
perceptions of forest fire risks, assuming instead that the probabilities that reveal risk 
attitudes relate to money gambles. We are not willing to concede that risk attitudes for 
money will carry over to risk attitudes for other outcomes, at least in every situation. 
A lot of research, much in the psychology literature, has demonstrated that risk or 
probabilities are very difficult for the layperson to understand and recommend different 
approaches for communicating risks to people and then eliciting their best estimate (e.g., 
see Corso et al. 2001; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; Hammit and Graham 1999). Just 
asking a person to state what they believe a probability is can be fraught with difficulty. 
Even when the best available estimates from scientists are presented as information, 
individuals who are asked seem to ignore this information, or form opinions that might be 
orders of magnitude away from the science (e.g., see Riddel and Shaw 2006). Hence, in 
this paper we implement a rediscovered, but quite old method of eliciting probabilities, 
the EM. The EM relies on the definition of exchangeable events as formulated by de 
Finetti in 1937. To our knowledge, though recently rediscovered by Baillon (2008) and 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011), this approach has not yet been used for eliciting environmental 
risk perceptions in empirical studies. 
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Using the EM, our subjects are not directly asked to state forest damage 
probability estimates. Instead, as will be explained below, our subjects are asked a series 
of choice questions that essentially reveal points on  each subject’s cumulative density 
function (CDF), where the probability relates to whether the forests will be damaged by 
the pine beetle. Using the exchangeability method we hope to avoid the usual problem of 
subjects’ understanding of probabilities, especially small ones (see Manski 2004). As 
researchers we indirectly infer the probability subjects attach to those outcomes, which is 
possible because of  the solid statistical theoretical foundation for the EM (Chew and 
Sagi, 2006). Using this EM framework, our main hypothesis is that stated or elicited risk 
estimates may be influenced by the underlying cause of pest damage. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. After very briefly reviewing the 
literature on elicitation of environmental risk, we explain the exchangeability method of 
risk elicitation and describe the way that our experimental study was implemented. 
Results for pine beetle risk estimates are presented and discussed in the final sections. 
Our tests of the consistency of responses provide some support for the notion  that 
subjects answer questions reliably.   
2. Perceptions and Policy Implications 
The IPCC provides a good deal of scientific evidence that climate change will 
change  forest ecosystems all around the world. Note that  in colder regions, forest 
ecosystems may gain from climate change because both temperature and precipitation 
will slightly increase, but in warmer regions, forests may be negatively impacted by this 
same trend  because of desertification: conditions will become too hot and dry.  In 
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currently dry or arid regions, the risk of further droughts may reduce forest net ecosystem 
productivity (NEP) and increase the risks of wildfires and insect pests (IPCC 2007).  
Specific impacts differ in different regions of the planet, but this trend is likely for 
the state of Texas, where scientists predicts that higher temperatures and lower 
precipitation will increase the chance of Southern Pine Beetle outbreaks or attacks. This 
insect already threatens pine forests in many other states, for example Alabama and 
Georgia. In Texas, most of the pine forests are in the east part of the state, where they 
cover an area of  around 12 million acres. From 1970 to 1996, the annual average volume 
of timber killed in Texas by southern pine beetle was almost 184,000 cubic meters for a 
value of about $ 120 million (Gan 2004).  
Policies to protect forests from further pine beetle destruction are possible, but 
need public support, and in Texas, as in most states within the United States, that 
translates to support of the state government. Given the high degree of uncertainty related 
to science-based estimates of climate-change risks, decision makers, including 
government officials, often make decisions according to their subjective estimates of 
those risks rather than on scientific predictions (Norris and Kramer, 1990). As an 
example, Pingali and Carson (1985) have shown that fruit farmers’ demand for different 
pest management strategies strongly depend on their perceptions of the damages to the 
orchards. More recently, Pregerning (2002) found that forest owners’ choices to engage 
in  restoration measures also rely on subjective perceptions of the urgency of the problem.  
Perceptions relate to willingness to support public investments in environmental 
protection, and if either the public, or the government, or both fail to believe something is 
a serious problem, then no resources will be forthcoming for that protection. For example, 
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Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006) showed that Americans who have higher perceptions of 
future temperature increases are willing to pay more for policies which address global 
warming. The perception or believe problem may also be an issue in the case of Texas 
forest owners who need to plan and implement forest management controls to avert the 
risk of pine beetle infestation in the future, or state government officials involved in 
funding such programs.  
By investigating laypeople’s perceptions of the pine beetle’s infestation rate, we 
aim to provide policy makers with useful information about public knowledge, concern 
and sensitivity to the issue. Based on scientific information provided by expert 
assessments and laypeople’s perceptions, policy makers will be able to plan forest 
management strategies that will be effective  in controlling the pest and agreeable to 
citizens. The knowledge of factors determining the formation of laypeople’s perceptions 
may help policy maker to better communicate environmental risks and design efficient 
campaign to promote the acceptability of risk-mitigation strategies.  
3. Literature review 
The literature on subjective probabilities and risk elicitation spans the fields of 
economics, psychology, and decision theory, and is much too vast to adequately cover 
here. The elicitation of risk, and more specifically, probabilities, is a relatively new 
research area in the context of environmental and resource economics, even though it has 
long been done in other contexts such as financial and health risks. To keep the current 
paper of manageable length and still adequately explain the EM, we refer the reader to 
more lengthy reviews of this literature (e.g., Viscusi, 1990; Dominitz and Manski, 1997; 
Manski, 2004; Shaw and Woodward, 2008; Andersen et al. 2010).  We note that many 
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empirical researchers have elicited qualitative measures of environmental risks, either 
indirectly or directly (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). For example, Siegrist and 
Gutsher (2006) asked both experts and laypeople to indicate the qualitative measures of 
flood risk for different regions of Switzerland. In a similar study in the Netherlands, 
Botzen et al. (2009) elicited not only qualitative, but also quantitative flood risk measures, 
directly asking people to express a point estimate of the probability of flood occurrence at 
their own home. Many  studies applying direct risk elicitation approaches have used 
visual aids, such as risk ladders or risk grids to assist subjects in forming their estimates 
of probability. The beneficial effect of visual aids in risk communication has been 
empirically demonstrated in several stated preference studies investigating the WTP for 
health risk reductions. When visual aids are used the estimates are consistent with 
theoretical expectations (Hammit and Graham, 1999; Corso et al., 2001; Visschers et al., 
2009).  
Despite these direct risk elicitation methods being very popular, scholars are still 
not sure of the reliability or accuracy of risk estimates elicited via this family of 
techniques. In contrast to direct techniques, one can indirectly infer subjective 
probabilities from individual choices over lotteries and for gambles or bets. These 
“indirect methods” have been widely used in experimental and behavioral economics, 
especially in the context of financial risks (e.g., Andersen et al., 2010). Choosing between 
two or more financial lotteries may be difficult for respondents because they have to 
make trade-offs between pairs of risky outcomes, considering both the magnitude of the 
environmental outcome and the probability of occurrence. Again, this may affect the 
reliability of subjective risk measures elicited using indirect methods.  
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Given concerns about the usual methods, and out of curiosity to see if it could be 
applied, we decided to elicit subjective risk estimates by using the recently resurfaced 
exchangeability method (Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). We chose the EM 
among many other indirect methodologies or games where probabilities can be elicited 
because of several attractive features. First, it is a relatively straightforward game to play. 
Second, it potentially allows elicitation of as many point estimates of  each respondent’s  
cumulative distribution function as the researcher feels she needs, subject to the 
respondent becoming exhausted.  
Finally, whereas many risk elicitation techniques are biased by source dependence, 
the EM is not. Some experimental studies have shown that individual choices depend on 
the source of uncertainty respondent have been told to consider (Kilka and Weber, 2001). 
When individuals have to simultaneously process more than one source of uncertainty1 
their risk estimates might be biased. This is likely to occur in lottery games where 
subjects have to deal with uncertainties related to both outcomes and probabilities. In 
contrast, when using the EM approach the subjects have only to deal with the outcomes.  
Naturally, all elicitation techniques have limitations, and the EM consists of 
chaining questions which may undermine the incentive compatibility of the game as well 
as the reliability of stated risk estimates (Wakker and Defenne, 1996; Baillon, 2008). 
Thus, below we test the consistency of subjects’ answers as a check on the reliability of 
the elicitation technique. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Baillon (2008) defines a source of uncertainty as “…a set of events that are generated by a common 
mechanism of uncertainty.” 
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3. Possible Influences on Forest Damage Estimates 
Rocky Mountain (Colorado) and Southern region U.S. pine forests have been 
historically threatened by the pine beetle (see Holmes, 1991). The problem has been 
growing rapidly in many regions of the U.S., leading to vast amounts of acreage of dead 
pine trees. The dead trees are unsightly (brown), and also pose an increased forest fire 
risk. In Texas, scientists predict that future increases in temperature and decreases in 
precipitation will facilitate the spread of threats by the Southern Pine Beetle (Gan, 2004). 
We focus on the potential increases in risk, expressed as the percentage of pine trees 
damaged or killed by the pine beetle between the period between 2010 and 2050.  
We hypothesize that, when provided with information on climate change being 
the source of pine beetle infestation, respondents will change their subjective perceptions 
of pest risk based on their beliefs about climate change impacts. Some individuals may 
cling to their prior beliefs, and may predict future events in a fashion consistent with 
those (e.g., the “home team betting” phenomenon, Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006). Thus, 
we also expected that some of our subjects would not believe in climate change as a 
factual phenomenon and that, when provided with information on climate change, 
skeptical subjects would not change their priors on the pest risk, or even reduce them. For 
other subjects who believe in climate change, the provision of the same information 
might raise a sense of alarm, leading them to increase their estimate of the percentage of 
damage to the forest associated with any given probability. We define these potential 
influences of people’s climate change beliefs on risk perceptions as a “climate change” 
effect.  
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We also investigate whether respondents’ risk perceptions differ for public and 
private forests: we have no priors on which direction of influence forest status might have 
on risks, if any. In the survey, respondents are informed that the infestation rate is equal 
for both forest types in 2009 and that no pine beetle control will be implemented (this is 
quite reasonable in the forest sector).  The only difference between public and private 
forests is the property rights people have to access lands and manage productive activities 
(i.e., harvest timber).    
Subjects who regularly engage in forest-based recreation may wish that forests 
will be protected in the future, and forecast this in their future risk estimate. Alternatively, 
strong concerns for the health status of forests they visit may result in higher estimates of 
infestation risk. Moreover, these individuals may not care about forests that are privately 
managed, and this lack of concern might be reflected in lower risk estimates. Risk 
perceptions of subjects who have ties to the forest industry may also be different from 
subjects with no such ties. 
All these phenomena are related to the fact that some subjects have a utility 
function that relates to forest protection. However, confounding the analysis is the fact 
that some subjects’ utilities are more directly related than others because they may have 
stakes in the outcomes. When utilities and perceived risks cannot be disentangled, the 
assumption of state-independent preferences may be violated, and hence the definition of 
unique subjective probabilities is difficult, or even impossible to formulate (Karni, 1993)2. 
If preferences and subjective probability estimates are related, then choice-based 
                                                 
2
 Dreze (1987) and Karni (2009) have developed alternative methods to elicit subjective probabilities when 
utilities are state dependent. Their approaches  rely on the presence of moral hazard, in the sense that 
subjects have the chance to take actions that modify the likelihood of the risky outcome.  However, our 
investigation excludes moral hazards as subjects have been told to assume that no destroyed trees will be 
replaced (replanted or restored) in the future scenarios. 
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elicitation techniques may provide biased results of the subjective probability estimates. 
Here, we cannot formally demonstrate that risk estimates for those with stakes in the 
outcomes (with ties to the forestry industry, for example) are biased as compared to the 
others, but we can at least compare the magnitude of risk estimates for the two groups. 
We investigate whether subjects with stakes (possibly with state-dependent utilities) will 
under- or overestimate perceived risks as compared to the subjects who have no stakes 
and whether such discrepancy significantly affect our results. We provide these results in 
section 8.2. 
4. Exchangeability method 
The EM uses a series of binary questions to reveal an individual’s underlying 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) over an event x that is drawn from an event space, 
SA. The first step of the EM establishes the lower and upper bounds of the event space, 
say S0 and S100. Each subject is asked the bounds on outcomes outside of which they are 
essentially certain the outcome cannot happen at all ― i.e., the bounds that contain a non-
zero probability of an outcome. The bounds of course may differ for each individual, and 
with complete ignorance of the problem, a rather wide range of bounds might be involved 
for most subjects (at the extreme, something cannot happen, or it definitely must, or will 
happen). Note that if priors can be elicited that are consistent with the estimates that arise 
during the implementation of the EM game, then one might motivate what happens here 
using Viscusi’s (1989) Prospective Reference Theory, a simple Bayesian updating 
model.3 
The second step involves asking a series of questions that establish the value of 
S50∈SA that corresponds with the 50th percentile of the subjective CDF, the median 
                                                 
3
 We thank an anonymous  reviewer for pointing this out. 
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estimate. This series of questions asks the subject to choose between binary prospects. In 
the first binary question, SA is divided at a point k1 into two prospects, say A1={S0≤x≤ k1} 
and B1={k1<x≤ S100}, where k1={S0 + [(S100 - S0)/2]}. If A1 was chosen by the individual, 
the implication is that the individual believes P(A1)≥P(B1), so that k1≥ S50.  A follow-up 
binary question is then asked of this same individual, using a new value k2 and two new 
prospects A2 and B2.  If A1 was chosen in the first question, then k2< k1. However, if B1 
was chosen in the first question, then k2> k1. This process is repeated until the individual 
reaches a value kn such that she is indifferent between An and Bn. When this point is 
reached, it follows that kn=S50. This series of questions have been used to arrive at a point 
estimate that corresponds to the median point for the CDF. 
A similar process can be followed to determine other points for the individual’s 
subjective CDF; in theory as many as the researcher wants, but of course limited by 
patience and cognition of the subject. To determine the value of S25∈SA that corresponds 
with the 25th percentile, a gamble is proposed that is contingent on a value of x that is 
lower than S50, obtained in the previous step. Once again, a sequence of values, k1, k2, …, 
kn is used, but in this case the initial upper bound is S50. In the first new binary question, 
subjects choose between the following binary prospects, A1={S0≤x≤k1} and  B1={k1<x≤ 
S50}. As above, without changing the upper bound, this process is repeated until the 
individual is indifferent between An and Bn, so that kn=S25 (see Figure 1). At the end of 
this procedure , we know that there is 25 percent chance that the percentage of damaged 
forest will be less than or equal to  S25∈SA. 
As noted above, even when respondents are provided with monetary incentives 
based on their choices during the game, the EM is not necessarily incentive compatible. 
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The sequence or chain of questions, which, upon completion reveal the point on the CDF, 
gives rise to doubt (see Baillon 2008). In their similar EM investigation, Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011) find evidence that real payments implemented using the same incentive scheme as 
Baillon (2008) has are less noisy than scenarios run without actual payments made. 
However, scrutiny of the CDFs for the real versus hypothetical treatments by Abdellaoui 
et al. (2011) reveals little difference between the scenarios with payment and without (see 
their Figures 6 and 7). In any case, there is no dominant strategy that respondents can 
follow over the series of questions used in the EM, and telling the truth about their beliefs 
may indeed be the simplest strategy for them (Baillon 2008). 
For our application here (to see if climate change influences risk estimates), 
consistency in the obtained data is all that we can explore. Thus, we focus on testing the 
consistency of subjects’ responses with some qualitative predictions that we formulate. 
5. Implementation   
In our implementation of the EM, done in the laboratory using a computerized 
version of the survey, subjects are asked to assess the percentage of the forest that will be 
damaged and destroyed by the pine beetle during the period between 2010 and 2050. A 
focus group ran prior to implementation suggested that subjects would respond best to 
losses couched as the percentages of a forest that are harmed, as opposed to specific 
numbers of trees or loss in volume, such as board feet or acreage.  Some previous 
psychological studies on risk communication have shown that people better understand 
probability when they are expressed as frequencies (e.g., Gigerenzer and  Hoffrage, 1995).  
Our programming software did not allow each individual’s initial range of the 
upper and lower bound to be input, and it was expected that few subjects would have any 
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prior knowledge of pine beetle damage, so we simply begin with the largest possible 
range for every subject: from S0 = 0% (no damage will happen) to S100 = 100% (the entire 
forest will be destroyed). Using these fixed lower and upper bounds rather than subjects’  
minimum and maximum expectations may induce the elicitation of biased risk measures. 
To examine this issue, we simulate subjects’ behaviors as if they have prior lower and 
upper bounds which are different from those we provided.  Then, we compare subject’s 
real and simulated choice behaviors in order to check the consistency of our risk 
estimates (see Section 8.1.3, below).   
Each binary question consists of two complementary percentage ranges of the 
forest that could be destroyed by the pine beetle. The set of first binary questions to 
determine the median probability (i.e., the value of S50∈SA that corresponds with the 50th 
percentile) begins with the choice between prospect A1={0%≤x≤ k1} and B1={k1<x≤ 
100%}, where k1={0% + [(100% - 0%)/2]}=50% (see Figure 2). Following the first 
choice, the exercise is repeated using a bisection of the chosen prospect, this time 
beginning with the new implied midpoint for the range from the first prospect. For 
example, if the subject chooses the lower range A1, then the second binary question splits 
the chosen prospect into A1={0%≤x≤ 25%} and B1={25%<x≤ 50%}. Once that second 
choice is made, the event space for the chosen prospect is split again. This bisecting 
process goes on until each prospect of the binary question does not cover a space smaller 
than 5 percent. At this point we pause and identify the estimate of the 50th percentile S50. 
We interpret this estimate to indicate the percentage of forest where the subject believes 
there is a 50 percent chance that the proportion of forest that might be destroyed is equal 
to or less than this, over the period.  
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A new sequence of binary questions begins, enabling identification of S25∈SA 
which corresponds with the 25th percentile. This new series of questions is contingent on 
the value S50 obtained from the first sequence, so that the first binary question is between 
the prospect A1={0%≤x≤ k1} and B1={k1<x≤ S50}, where k1={0% + [(S50 - 0%)/2]}. This 
procedure goes on until the range is small enough to identify the estimate of the 25th 
percentile S25. Similar to above, our interpretation of the final value is that it reveals the 
percentage of forest where the subject believes there is 25 percent chance that the 
proportion of forest that might be destroyed is equal to or less than this.  
After that is completed, a new sequence of questions is implemented following 
the same logic to estimate S75∈SA corresponding to the 75th percentile. In this case, there 
is 75 percent chance that a percentage of forests less than or equal to the estimated value 
of S75 will be destroyed.  
To avoid fatigue of the subjects, our study confines estimates to these three 
probability points; thus, in this manner, the indifference points for the events 
corresponding to the cumulative probabilities are found, allowing us to map out a portion 
of the subjective CDF for each subject.  
6. Sample and Survey Design 
Our subject pool consists of 134 Texas A&M undergraduate students from a 
range of subject disciplines. They were randomly selected by using the informatics 
platform of the Texas A&M Economics Research Laboratory where undergraduate 
students can register themselves in order to participate to economics experiment. The 
experiment was carried out at the Texas A&M Economics Research Laboratory in March 
2010. Each subject was paid a flat $10 participation fee and provided with the basic rules 
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of the economic laboratory. Note that in what follows, we use wording commonly used in 
experimental economics, even though our choice tasks are hypothetical. 
The experiment consists of five experimental sessions and five groups of subjects, 
one group for each session (Table 1). Hence, one group of subjects only participates in 
one session. Each session corresponds to a specific experimental treatment, in each 
treatment subjects are presented with different information. Four of these group 
treatments can be thought of as between-subjects experimental treatment investigations. 
In the first session, all of the subjects are told that the impacted forest is a public access 
forest (“public forest-no climate change” treatment), and in the second session all are told 
that the impacted forest is private (“private forest-no climate change” treatment). In each 
of these first two treatments, subjects have been told that the pine beetle infestation likely 
occurs, and depends on an increase in temperature and a decrease in precipitation,  but the 
terms “climate change” or “global warming” were not mentioned. In the third session, we 
provide the same information as in the  first treatment group, but we also specifically 
describe climate change as the cause of possible increases in pine beetle infestation on a 
public access forest (“public forest-climate change” treatment). The fourth session is 
similar, combing session two’s private forest with the climate change cause (“private 
forest-climate change” treatment). Finally, the fifth session is a within-subjects 
investigation of the public versus private forest effect in which climate change is not 
mentioned  (“public & private forest-no climate change”). In this last session the sample 
is also split in two sub-samples: one sub-sample receives a scenario where they are first 
asked to assume the forest is public access (“public-private” treatment), then the exercise 
is repeated for a private access forest (“private-public” treatment); the other sub-sample 
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faces a scenario where the order of the exercises is reversed, to allow a test for order 
effects. This last treatment was undertaken to allow exploration of the private versus 
public effect for each individual subject.    
After the experimental instruction have been provided, all subjects in all sessions 
are next asked whether they have any familiarity with the pine beetle issue and to provide 
a simple guess of the chance that a pine beetle infestation that destroys 10 percent of the 
forest will happen (i.e., we asked for a guess at the point estimate or, in case respondents 
were not able to do that, a stated range estimate).  Then we provide them with specific 
information about the acreage of forests that has been damaged by the pine beetle in the 
period between 1960 and 2009. Identical pictures of healthy and damaged forests are 
shown to all subjects, no matter which treatment group they belong to. They have also 
been told that this insect dies when very cold temperatures are reached, and that it thrives 
when warm and dry climatic conditions happen. Further information has been given to 
subjects depending to the experimental treatment they belong to. At this point, they have 
all information to start playing the Exchangeability game (Appendix A). All subjects are 
also asked to play the game assuming that no destroyed trees will be replaced (replanted 
or restored) in the future scenarios, so that the baseline future conditions are the same for 
all subjects. 
After the Exchangeability game is completed, all subjects are also asked whether 
they would agree with statements that climate change is going to raise temperatures 
(Appendix A). In addition, they are asked a series of demographic questions, including 
their household income, gender, whether they engage in recreation in any public Texas 
forests, and years of residence in Texas. Ideally, incentive compatibility is desirable, and 
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if we could, we would play out a draw to yield the probability that forests are damaged, 
and then go ahead and damage the forest, letting the subjects witness this actual process. 
This is of course impossible, unless one resorts to some sort of computer simulation or 
stylized representation of the forest being damaged (for example, killing only one part of 
one tree which symbolizes the killing of many trees). Despite this, we know of no other 
application of the EM to an environmental or resource problem and do not know of any 
attempt to elicit pine beetle damage risks, as we do here. 
Finally, simply to increase the subjects’ potential monetary reward for participating 
in our experiment, keep them in the room, and keep them focused on the questions, 
subjects were told at the beginning that after all tasks were completed, two randomly 
drawn subjects from each treatment group engaged in a coin toss game4. Four questions 
for each selected subject were randomly drawn and the winning outcome for the drawn 
questions was determined by a coin toss. The drawn subjects was paid if their choices to 
the drawn questions corresponded to the winning outcomes, otherwise they earned 
nothing. 
Given that the coin toss (with a 50% probability of a win) had no connection to the 
damage probability estimates, as would be true in a probability scoring approach, this 
procedure could have potentially biased subjects’ behavior, possibly inducing them to 
just randomly choose between outcomes.5 However, as the context of the draw for a win 
was focused on being randomly chosen among all the subjects, as well as having a 
particular question chosen, we do not think the subjects would confuse the EM game 
choices with the choice for a coin toss. Still to reduce doubt about this issue, we test for 
                                                 
4
 The maximum possible reward for participant was $200, excluding the participation fee 
5
 A reviewer raised this possibility. 
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the consistency of subjects’ choices during the game and we find that their behaviors are 
consistent with several qualitative predictions we formulate. Detailed results are 
presented below in Section 8.1.3. 
 
7. Specific Hypotheses 
The key response variables under study for the five treatments are all elicited 
percentages of damaged forest by the pine beetle during the period between 2010 and 
2050, corresponding to three key points of the subject’s CDF (S25, S50, and S75). 
The hypotheses that we test are the following: 
1. The subjective infestation risk of the southern pine beetle on public access forests is 
the same as the subjective infestation risk distribution for privately owned forests. For 
example, for S25, the null is Ho to be compared to the alternative, H1: 
 
H0: distribution(S25)public-no climate change =   distribution(S25)private-no climate change      
H1: distribution(S25)public-no climate change ≠   distribution(S25)private-no climate change     
 
2. The subjective infestation risk on a public access forests when climate change is 
mentioned is the same when climate change is not mentioned.  For example, for S25: 
 
H0: distribution(S25)public-no climate change =  distribution(S25)public-climate change      
H1: distribution(S25)public-no climate change ≠  distribution(S25)public-climate change      
 
We use two different strategies in order to tests these hypotheses. First, we 
essentially separately compare the distributions of each elicited percentages of damaged 
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and killed trees between treatment groups by using standard nonparametric tests. Second, 
we provide a simple behavioral/regression model explaining how environmental attitudes, 
socio-economic factors, and treatment effects influence subjects’ pest risk perceptions. 
The power of the regression model stems from the larger sample, and allows a check on 
the robustness of the non-parametric tests. In addition, it allows us to consider the role 
that demographic and other variables for which survey data is available might play in 
explaining the variation of revealed risks.  
 
8. Results 
8.1. Nonparametric tests 
The potential effects of ownership (forest access) and climate change can be 
initially assessed by analyzing the difference in the variables under study (S25, S50, and 
S75). To preview, we find that means and standard deviations do not differ between 
“public” and “private” treatments, but they do between “climate change” and “not climate 
change” information treatments (Table 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
In all between-subjects analyses, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (KS) were also 
conducted in case the reliability of the Mann-Whitney U test (MW) was compromised by 
the violation of the assumption of similar shapes between the two population distributions 
from which the data were obtained. In all within-subjects analyses, we tested our 
hypotheses first through the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (WMP) and then 
through the Sign test of matched pairs (SMP), in case the reliability of the first test was 
compromised by the violation of the assumption of symmetric distributions of the 
differences between variables’ values for each subject. 
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8.1.1. Ownership/Access effect  
The effect of forest access or ownership is investigated through between-subjects 
and also within-subjects investigations (the fifth treatment). In the between-subjects 
investigations, the comparison of the subjective risks between “public forest” and 
“private forest” treatments is performed twice, once when climate change is not 
mentioned and again when it is mentioned. In the first case, we have two independent 
samples, “public forest-no climate change information” (38 subjects) and “private forest-
no climate change information” (43 subjects). Based on the KS test, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of identical distributions of the variables under study (S25, S50, and S75)  
between the two independent groups (“public forest-no climate change information” and 
“private forest-no climate change information”) (see Table 3). In the two treatments 
where climate change is mentioned, assuming we still have two independent samples, 
there is a “public forest-climate change” sample (21 subjects) and a “private forest-
climate change” sample (32 subjects). Here the KS test again lead us to fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of identical distributions of the variables under study (S25, S50, and S75) 
for the two independent samples. (Table 4). Results of the between-subjects 
investigations indicate that subjective risk perception is not influenced by the nature 
access to forests. 
The within-subject investigation allows comparison of elicited risk for the same 
person. This analysis is performed without mentioning climate change. The fifth 
treatment group contains 30 subjects. As we expected, the WMP test rejects the null 
hypothesis of identical median values of the variables under study (S25, S50, and S75): 
there are differences in risks elicited for the same person, depending upon access or 
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ownership (Table 5). However, the SMP test does not lead to rejection of the null 
hypothesis of equal median values for S25 and S50, but does lead us to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal median values for private and public forests for S75 (Table 5), 
suggesting that subjective damage estimates for public forests are greater than for private 
forests6. 
Based on the within-subjects analysis, we conclude that subjective estimates of 
the percentages of damaged forest by the pine beetle during the period is higher for public 
forests than for private forests. The discrepancy in results between these two analyses 
(between versus within-subjects) is discussed below, in Section 9. 
8.1.2. Climate Change 
The role of climate change in affecting individual perceptions of the risk is 
analyzed using the between-subjects investigations. Recall that the group which receives 
climate change information also is differentiated into two groups, one presented with a 
public, and the other with a private forest. For comparison of the risk variables from 
“public-no climate change” (38 subjects) and “public-climate change” (21 subjects) 
groups, the KS test leads us to fail to reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions 
of the variable under study (S25, S50, and S75) for the two independent samples (“public-no 
climate change” and “public-climate change”) (Table 6).  
Last, we compare the distributions between “private-no climate change” (43 
subjects) and “private-climate change” (32 subjects) samples. In this case, the KS test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis for S50, but it rejects the null hypothesis for S25 and S75 
(at 5% and 10% significance levels respectively). In both cases, we detect  statistically 
                                                 
6
 Order effects may have mattered, so we tested for the effect of presenting subjects first with the public 
forest, then the private forest, and vice versa. The MW test demonstrates the absence of an order effects . 
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significant differences in the distributions of variables S25 and S75 when subjects are 
informed about climate change being the underlying cause of the pine beetle infestation, 
as compared to the treatment where the subjects are not told this (Table 7). 
The above results about potential differences in perceptions of pest risk due to the 
source of the environmental risk are interesting, but further analyses are possible because 
previous results suggest that risk perceptions are not influenced by property rights on 
forests. We create two combined samples by pooling all observations of “private-no 
climate change” and “public-no climate change” into a “no climate change” sample and 
by pooling all observations of “private-climate change” and “public-climate change” into 
a “climate change” sample. The KS test rejects the null hypothesis of equal population 
distributions between the two samples (“climate change” and “no climate change”) in all 
cases (S25, S50, and S75). Again, we found that distributions of the “climate change” 
sample differ from that of  “no climate change” sample (Table 8).   
We conclude that the distributions of the combined sample with no climate 
change information significantly differ from the distributions of the sample with climate 
change information. Climate change information appears to matter, increasing the 
subjective pest risk perceived by our subjects who are exposed to it. 
8.1.3. Consistency of subjects’ choice behavior 
Next, following Baillon (2008), we check whether respondents’ behaviors are 
consistent with some qualitative predictions. To begin, we choose for each respondent a 
value s’ between her/his estimates of S50 and S75. Then, following the usual bisectioning 
process, we find an s’’ such that {S25 < x ≤ s’’} and {s’’ < x ≤ s’} are exchangeable 
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partitions7. This implies that the value s’’ should be between S25 and S50 and should be 
closer to S50 than to S25 (S25< s’’< S50 and | S50 - s’’| < | S25 - s’’|) (Test 1).  
Consistency of respondents’ choices are also tested using another approach from 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) (Test 2). For this one we calculate a hypothetical value of S50 for 
each respondent, S50’, such that {S25<x≤ S50’} and {S50’<x≤ S75} are exchangeable 
partitions. Then we check if respondents’ estimates of S50 are consistent with hypothetical 
values of S50’ (S50 = S50’).  
These hypotheses are tested using a parametric paired t test because the size of the 
whole sample is large enough for this scope. We found that all predictions are satisfied at 
the 10% significant level showing the consistency of respondents’ choice behavior (Table 
9). Consistency tests provide assurance that the paying subjects following a coin toss did 
not affect their choice behavior and that our scenarios are meaningful as compared to the 
more concrete contexts used by Baillon (2008) and Abdellauoi et al. (2011).  
Furthermore, we test whether risk estimates obtained by providing all subjects 
with the same lower (S0 = 0%) and upper bounds (S100 = 100%)  will affect subjects’ 
choice behaviors. Subjects may have their own priors and therefore, our failure to allow 
for these may induce the elicitation of biased risk measures.8 It is likely that subjects start 
playing the game, first having in mind rough estimates of the percentage of damaged 
forest in the period 2011-2050. Hence, we assume that hypothetical subjects i = {1,..,13} 
play the exchangeability game having the following priors PS50 = {20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 
50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80}. In particular, let subject 1 have outcome PS50 = 20, subject 2 
has outcome S50 = 20, and so on, until subject 13, has S50 = 80. Using these hypothetical 
                                                 
7
 Baillon (2008) defines two events as exchangeable for an assessor if “...she is indifferent to permutations 
of their outcomes”.   
8
 We acknowledge a reviewer for spotting this possibility. 
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priors, for each subject i, we simulate (1) the median estimates S50 when she/he was 
provided with fixed lower (S0 = 0%) and upper bounds (S100 = 100%), (2) with 
hypothetical and symmetric lower (S0 = 20%) and upper bounds (S100 = 80%),  (3) with 
hypothetical and left-shifted lower (S0 = 5%) and upper bounds (S100 = 80%), and  (4) 
with hypothetical and right-shifted lower (S0 = 20%) and upper bounds (S100 = 95%).  
If simulated risk estimates do not differ from each other, then the provision of 
fixed boundaries do not affect subjects’ choice behaviors and, hence, their risk estimates. 
Both WMP  and SMP tests show that simulated risk estimates do not statistically differ 
from each other (Table 10). Thus, we conclude that, despite the provision of fixed 
boundaries rather than subjective ones, we still obtain reliable estimates. 
8.2. Regression Model and Results 
In this section we provide an additional regression model that further illustrates 
how the ownership and climate change effects, the subject’s environmental attitudes, and 
their socio-economic characteristics shape subjective pest risks. The dependent variable 
(y) is the subjects’ estimates of the percentage of damaged trees by the pine beetle, and 
all three elicited from each subject are used (i.e., S25, S50, and S75). 
Given that this dependent variable is a probability bounded by 0 and 1 (0 ≤ y ≤ 1),  
we should not  estimate a simple OLS model unless we transform our dependent variable 
by using specific algorithms. Hence, we first create a new dependent variable by using an 
angular transformation, such as yy arcsin=′ . The transformed variable y′  can now 
take any value and thus this allows us to use an OLS estimation procedure, Model 1, 
although there is not any underlying theoretical explanation for why one should use this 
strategy. 
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An alternative and very popular way to handle this issue for a variable with 0,1 
bounds consists of modeling the log-odds ratio as a linear function and then using a OLS 
estimation procedure on this ratio. In this alternative approach, we transform our 
dependent variable as follows, )]1/(ln[ yyy −=′′ , which is our Model 2. However, this 
procedure also has limitations. First, the estimates are biased if positive probabilities are 
associated with 0=′′y   or 1=′′y , and second, it does not allows analysts to directly 
infer the expected value, ][ xyE ′′ .  
Thus, because of limitations of Models 1 and 2, we also apply Papke and 
Woolridge’s (1996) quasi-likelihood method based on a generalized linear models 
(GLM) framework. In this case, we do not need to transform our dependent variable, but 
we need to make assumptions on the distribution of our dependent variable and the 
relationship between our dependent and independent variables which is expressed by the  
link function. Given that our dependent variable tells us about the percentage of the forest 
that will be damaged and relative percentage that will be not damaged, we assume that it 
has a binomial distribution.  Furthermore, in our Model 3, we assume that the link 
function is logistic (see Cameron and Trivedi, p. 149, 2005).  
In these three models, we need to consider that each subject provides three risk 
estimates, one related to the first quartile of her/his CDF (S25), one to the median (S50) 
estimate, and the last to the second quartile (S75). Hence, we explain the variation in the 
dependent variable using clustering our sample at the subject level. This approach takes 
care of the potential correlation between responses that come from the same individual 
subject, while allowing for exploration of the effect of covariates on the risk responses.  
Summarizing, we estimate the following three models:  
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 (1)        isisis Xyy εβα ++==′ arcsin  
(2)        isisis Xyyy υβα ++=−=′′ )]1/(ln[  
(3)       isisis Xgy ηβα ++= )(   
 
where i = {1, 2,…, 164}indicates the subject and s = {S25, S50, S75} is the observation for 
each subject. The error terms differ, according to the specification of the dependent 
variable, and the α term represents an unobservable for the cluster group (each subject). 
In the third model above the dependent variable yis has a binomial distribution and the 
link function corresponding to g is a logit. 
Factors shaping subjective risk are represented by a set of continuous and discrete 
variables (in the vector X). Table 11 provides definitions, means, minima, and maxima 
for the explanatory variables. First, RISK_PR is a continuous variable (between 0 and 100 
percent) representing the subject’s stated prior estimate of the risk (chance) that the pine 
beetle will destroy 10 percent of the forest during the period. However, subjects could 
decide to provide an estimated range for this prior, rather than a point estimate. The width 
of this range (AMB) might be interpreted as a proxy for ambiguity (e.g., see discussion of 
the range of risk estimates and relations to ambiguity in risk in Riddel and Shaw, 2006; or 
Riddel 2011). We realize that the forest trips variable, FOR_VIS, is typically a choice, 
modeled as an endogenous variable in recreation demand models. However, for our 
model of subjects’ reported damage estimates, we do not suspect that many factors that 
would explain a subject’s damage estimate, and for which we have data, overlap much 
with those that explain taking trips. The variable TIMBER_LINK identifies subjects who 
are tied to timber industry, while RURAL subjects who originally comes from rural areas.  
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As noted above, some subjects had ties to the timber industry and may  under or 
overestimate perceived risks as compared to the subjects who have no direct stakes in the 
forests’ well-being. In our sample, we have only eight subjects who are involved in 
timber production, but  they have lower estimates than the others. On average, their 
estimates of variables S25, S50, and S75  are 19.94, 21.94, and 28.49 percent as compared to 
31.75, 37.40, 42.29 percent for the others. We also  observe that combining those few 
observations provided by subjects with stakes with the the pool without such stakes  does 
not significantly influence  the magnitude of the estimates of the variables S25, S50, and 
S75. In fact, pooling all observations, the mean values of S25, S50, and S75 are equivalent to 
31.18, 36.64, and 41.61 percent. The discrepancy is less than 1 percent for all variables. 
Thus, it appears that, even if we assume that the subjects with stakes provide biased 
estimates, this does not significantly affect our overall results.  
In addition two complete sets of dummy variables are used in estimation. The first 
of these is composed of indicators for all of the individual games, i.e., the exercises where 
the variable values for S25, S50, and S75 are obtained. The second set is composed of 
indicator variables for the treatments: Tpu-nocc for “public-no climate change” treatment, 
Tpr-nocc for “private-no climate change”, Tpu-cc for “public-climate change”, Tpr-cc for 
“private-no climate change”, Tpu for “public-no climate change” used in within-subjects 
analysis and Tpr for “private-no climate change” used in within-subjects analysis. 
We estimate Models 1 and 2 using OLS, while we estimate Model 3 using the 
GLM approach described above. In all cases, we compute robust standard errors and 
cluster our observations at individual level as each subject provides three different 
observations. The regression results are reported in Table 12, and note that there is a 
 30
distinct superiority of the GLM approach. We therefore focus on the results related to 
Model 3. The subject’s prior estimate of the risk for 10 percent of the forest to be 
damaged negatively (RISK_PR) influences the subject’s estimates of forest damage (at 
the 1 percent significance level). Those with a larger initial prior have significantly lower 
estimates of damage after being given information on the current low level of pine beetle 
infestation in Texas forests later in the survey.  
A larger ambiguity proxy (AMB) related to the prior risk estimate indicates the 
subject is initially more uncertain than those who provide a point estimate or narrower 
width. This initial uncertainty appears to be significantly (at the 10 percent significance 
level) and positively related to the damage estimates obtained in the games, and this is 
consistent with reports in the literature that find that ambiguity may influence preferences 
(e.g., Baker et al., 2009). 
Subjects who are personally tied to the timber industry (TIMB_LINK) and who are 
active forest recreationists (FOR_VIS) have damage estimates which are lower than other 
subjects, although significance is relatively weak here (at the 10 percent levels). This may 
be because they have a better knowledge of the actual low infestation level in Texas or 
because they have bet on the outcome they would like to experience in the future. This 
positive feeling about a future scenario is deemed as desirability bias in the psychological 
literature. As suggested earlier, perhaps actual forest users sought out forests that do not 
suffer from pine beetle problems and thus discount the possibility of extensive future 
damage. To explore potential endogeneity in FOR_VIS, we re-estimated the regression 
without it, but this had no affect on the other coefficients. We also tried substitution for 
the forest visits variable (FOR_VIS) with the more simple indication of forest use 
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(FOR_USE)9, but the discrete indicator coefficient was not significantly different from 
zero. The intensity of use captured in trips taken may encompass recent knowledge of the 
forests and their health. The other demographic and attitudinal variables had no 
significant effect on the dependent variable. 
On the contrary, subjects who comes from rural areas (RURAL) have greater 
damage estimates than the others as they likely know the positive correlation between 
climatic variables (especially temperature, precipitation, and humidity) and the 
development of agricultural pests (at the 10% significance level), but they do not gain any 
utility from the fact that forest will be not damaged by the pine beetle.  
According to our expectations, we found that damage estimates relative to the 
median (S50) and second quartile (S75) of individual CDFs are higher than those relative 
to the first quartile (S25). Of course, this is consistent with the laws of probability theory.  
Finally, we econometrically test whether damage observations differ across 
treatment groups. This analysis allows us to statistically test again the “ownership/access 
effect” and the “climate change effect” relying on a larger number of observations. We 
consider the treatment group “private forest” in the within-subjects analysis as our 
reference group. This treatment group provided the lowest mean value of damaged 
estimates (see Table 2).  
Analyzing the “ownership/access effect” in the within-subjects treatment we 
found that subjects perceive forest damage to be greater in public forests than in private 
ones (at the 10% significance level). This is consistent with our results from 
nonparametric testing. Interestingly, when subjects are asked only to estimate damages 
for private forests as it occurs in the “private forest-no climate change information” 
                                                 
9
 Forest use (FOR_USE) is a discrete indicator variable with two levels (1=forest users, 0=otherwise). 
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treatment, they show higher risk estimates than when people are asked to complete the 
same task by comparing forest damages in private and public forests as it occurs in the 
within-subjects treatment (at the 5% significance level). Furthermore, subjects’ estimates 
keep on increasing when subjects are asked only to estimate damages for public forests as 
it occurs in the “public forest-no climate change information” treatment (at the 5% 
significance level). 
Finally, we show that informing subjects that climate change is the source of the 
pine beetle infestation increase their estimates of damages in both private and public 
forests (both at the 1% significance level) as compared to our reference group. This 
support the “climate change” effect we have already shown in our nonparametric testing.  
9. Discussion 
We obtain mixed results on the significance of forest access and climate change 
information on risk estimates. The nature of the treatment matters (i.e., whether we 
consider between-subjects or within-subjects). Subjects do not seem to care about the 
public or private nature of forests in the between-subjects analysis maybe because both 
public and private forest owners face the same risk and have the same management 
options. However, but when presented with both types of forests in the within-subjects 
analysis, the same subject, on average has a higher estimate of risk when publicly 
accessed forests are considered than when private ones are. This may be due to 
heterogeneity across subjects, but could also be due to the different treatment process.  
To explore the first possibility, Table 13 provides some summary statistics for 
variables that might differ for subjects between treatment groups. These casually suggest 
that differing results for the between versus within-subjects analyses are not caused by 
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differences in the composition of the subject sample in terms of either connections to 
family or friends in the timber industry, or extent of their use of public forest (see rows 
15 to 22 of Table 13). The percentage of all of our subjects with a relationship to 
someone in the timber industry is very low both in the between- and within-subjects 
samples, ranging from 0 to 6 percent. In contrast, the percentage of subjects who used 
public forests is relatively high in both samples, ranging from 56 to 71 percent. The 
average number of recreational visits-subjects took during the last year ranges from 2 to 6 
trips or visits. A MW test does not detect significant statistical differences for the 
between-subjects versus within-subjects treatment groups in terms of the distribution of 
their trips or visits. 
However, one possible explanation for the difference in damage risk perceptions 
for the within-subjects treatment pertains to a very low degree of familiarity with the pine 
beetle problem, as is evident in rows 1 to 8 of Table 13. Our subjects’ uniformly limited 
knowledge about the pine beetle problem probably increases the perception of a 
difference between the pest risk in public and private forests, only if, and when the 
subject can make a direct comparison between the two cases, as occurs in the within 
subjects treatment.  
Evaluating the treatment groups separately, the distributions of the dependent 
variables evaluated at each of the three underlying probabilities are not significantly  
different when climate change is mentioned for publicly accessed forests, but they are for 
private forests, at two points (S25 and S75). However, when we pool all the observations 
for the public and private forests for both when climate change is mentioned and when it 
is not, there is a statistically significant difference between the distributions for all three 
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evaluated points (S25, S50, and S75): risks are higher when climate change is mentioned. 
Pooling appears justified because risk perceptions are not influenced by the public or 
private nature of the forest in the between-subjects investigations.  
Our results support the “home team betting” hypothesis (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 
2006), mentioned above. Contrary to our expectations, many respondents are confident 
that climate change is already happening and that it will also happen in the future. In 
particular, the majority of the subjects in the “climate change” treatment groups agree 
with statements such as “climate change is already happening” and “climate change will 
happen in the future,” as shown in rows 10 to 13 of Table 13. The provision of 
information on climate change being the source of pine beetle infestation to these people 
increases their subjective perceptions of pest risk. 
10. Conclusions 
 
 Although risks are a fundamentally important part of climate change or global 
warming, science-based risk estimates are characterized by very wide confidence 
intervals. This makes subjective or perceived risks important in assessing decisions that 
must be made now in order to potentially affect outcomes in the future. Our analysis is 
focused on the relationship between potential climate change impacts and pine beetle 
damage on forests, admittedly a somewhat small part of the overall climate change or 
global warming picture. We find some support in the analysis that climate change 
information affects individuals’ risk perceptions and it may be that this has broader 
implications for other risky climate change impacts. Our method in the risk elicitation is a 
rediscovered one in the literature, and whether it is incentive compatible is still in 
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question (see Abdelloui et al., 2011), but the results show a high degree of internal 
consistency for subjects. 
Much more could be done to improve on what we have here. If a consistent prior 
is asked of respondents, the EM framework could perhaps be closely tied to Viscusi’s 
(1989) Prospective Reference Theory, wherein a simple Bayesian approach motivates 
updating of estimates based on information.  
___________ 
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Table 1 Description of the experimental treatments 
Session Treatment Type Description 
1 Public Forest –  
No Climate Change 
Between 
Subjects 
Subjects play the EM considering a public forest and 
having no information on climate change 
2 Private Forest –  
No Climate Change 
Between 
Subjects 
Subjects play the EM considering a private forest and 
having no information on climate change 
3 Public Forest –  
Climate Change 
Between 
Subjects 
Subjects play the EM considering a public forest and 
having information on climate change 
4 Private Forest –  
Climate Change 
Between 
Subjects 
Subjects play the EM considering a private forest and 
having information on climate change 
5 Private&Public Forest –  
No Climate Change 
Within 
Subjects 
Subjects play the EM considering both public and 
private forests, but having no information on climate 
change 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 Between-subjects analysis 
b
 Within-subjects analysis 
c
 Pooling “Public-climate change” + “Private-climate change” samples 
d
 Pooling  “Public-no climate change” + “Private-no climate change” samples  
 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics of elicited percentages of damaged and killed trees by the pine beetle in the 
period between 2010 and 2050 for each treatment group. 
Treatment Obs. 
Mean Median Std. dev. 
S25 S50 S75 S25 S50 S75 S25 S50 S75 
Public-no climate 
changea 38 30.8 35.8 40.9 26.5 34.5 37.0 22.2 23.6 25.3 
Private-no climate 
changea  43 27.0 33.0 37.5 24.0 28.0 30.5 20.5 22.4 23.6 
Public-no climate 
changeb 30 29.0 33.9 39.2 19.5 22.0 30.0 25.9 27.6 28.7 
Private-no climate 
changeb 30 18.6 23.5 29.5 14.0 19.0 22.5 18.0 20.9 25.9 
Public-climate 
changea 21 40.6 49.4 53.8 39.0 53.0 55.0 24.7 25.4 25.2 
Private-climate 
changea 32 38.1 42.7 48.1 39.0 41.0 44.0 23.0 24.0 23.7 
Climate changea,c 53 39.1 45.4 50.4 39.0 41.0 47.0 23.5 24.5 24.2 
No climate changea,d  81 28.8 34.3 39.1 26.5 28.0 35.0 21.3 22.9 24.3 
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Table 3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing elicited percentages of 
damaged and killed trees between “public-no climate change” and “private-no 
climate change”. 
H0 P-value 
Distribution S25, pu- nocc = Distribution  S25, pr-nocc  .970 
Distribution S50, pu-nocc = Distribution S50, pr-nocc .998 
Distribution S75, pu-nocc = Distribution S75, pr-nocc .945 
pu-nocc is the “public-no climate change” treatment in the between-subjetcs 
analysis 
pr-nocc is the “private-no climate change” treatment in the between-subjetcs 
analysis 
Table 4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing elicited percentages of 
damaged and killed trees between “public-climate change” and “private-climate 
change” 
H0 P-value 
Distribution  S25, pu- cc = Distribution  S25, pr-cc  .895 
Distribution S50, pu-cc = Distribution S50, pr-cc .891 
Distribution S75, pu-cc = Distribution S75, pr-cc .973 
pu-cc is the “public-climate change” treatment in the between-subjects analysis 
pr-cc is the “private-climate change” treatment in the between-subjects analysis 
 
Table 5 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and Sign test of matched pairs for comparing 
elicited percentages of damaged and killed trees between “public” and “private”. 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test Sign test of matched pairs 
H0 Prob>|z| H0 Prob>|z| 
Median S25, pu = Median S25, pr  .0689 Median S25, pu = Median S25, pr  .3075 
Median S50, pu = Median S50, pr .0697 Median S50, pu = Median S50, pr .2100 
Median S75, pu = Median S75, pr .0579 Median S75, pu =Median S75, pr .0466 
pu is the “public-no climate change” treatment in the within-subjetcs analysis 
pr is the “private-no climate change” treatment in the within-subjetcs analysis 
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Table 6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing elicited percentages of 
damaged and killed trees between “public-no climate change” and “public-
climate change” 
H0 P-value 
Distribution S25, pu- cc  =  Distribution S25, pr-cc  .250 
Distribution S50, pu-cc  =   Distribution S50, pr-cc .230 
Distribution S75, pu-cc  =  Distribution S75, pr-cc .106 
Table 7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing elicited percentages of 
damaged and killed trees between “private-no climate change” and “private-
climate change” 
H0 P-value 
Distribution S25, pu- cc  =  Distribution S25, pr-cc  .0171 
Distribution S50, pu-cc  =   Distribution S50, pr-cc .1563 
Distribution S75, pu-cc  =  Distribution S75, pr-cc .0661 
Table 8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing elicited percentages of 
damaged and killed trees between “no climate change” and “climate change”. 
H0 P-value 
Distribution S25, no cc  =  Distribution S25, cc  .0072 
Distribution S50, nocc   =  Distribution S50, cc .0344 
Distribution S75, nocc   =   Distribution S75, cc .0063 
cc is derived by pooling “Public-climate change” plus “Private climate change” 
samples 
nocc is derived by pooling “Public-no climate change” plus “Private-no climate 
change” samples 
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Table 9 Paired t test for consistency 
H0 t 
s’’ = S25 9.6823* 
s’’ = S50 -3.9213* 
| S50 - s’’| = | S25 - s’’| 15.3148* 
S50 = S50’ -0.5909 
Table 10 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and Sign test of matched pairs for 
comparing elicited percentages of damaged and killed trees using fixed boundaries, hypothetical 
and symmetric boundaries, hypothetical and left-shifted boundaries, and  hypothetical and right-
shifted boundaries. 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test Sign test of matched pairs 
H0 Prob>|z| H0 Prob>|z| 
Median S50, fx = Median S25, hs  .9435 Median S50, fx =  Median S25, hs  .1000 
Median S50, fx = Median S50, hal .9719 Median S50, fx = Median S50, har .1000 
Median S75, fx  = Median S75, har .6220 Median S75, fx = Median S75, hal .1000 
fx are risk estimates obtained by using fixed boundaries S0 = 0% and S100 = 100% 
hs are risk estimates obtained by using fixed boundaries S0 = 20% and S100 = 80%  
hal are risk estimates obtained by using fixed boundaries S0 = 5% and S100 = 80% 
har are risk estimates obtained by using fixed boundaries S0 = 20% and S100 = 95% 
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Table 11 Regression Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Definition Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. 
%DAM 
 
Percentage of damaged trees in the 
period 2010-2050 a 
0.36 
 
0.25 0.10 0.99 
%DAM_ANG Angular Transformation  0.51 0.19 0.09 0.84 
%DAM_LOR Log-Odds ratio Transformation -0.76 1.57 -4.59 5.29 
RISK_PR Prior risk estimate for 10% of forest 
damaged during 2010-2050  
0.53 0.22 0.00 0.10 
 
AMB Width of range for those who provide a 
range rather than point estimate a 
0.52 
 
0.17 
 
0.00 
 
0.85 
0 
GW-PAST Agreement with scientists about global 
warming in the past (at 5 levels) b 
2.42 1.48 0.00 4.00 
GW-FUT Agreement with scientists about global 
warming in the future (at 5 levels) b 
2.18 1.22 0.00 
 
   4.00 
AC_KN Attendance at seminars about climate 
change and pest  
.27 .44 0.00 1.00 
MC_KN Viewer or reader of scientific programs 
or articles about climate change and pest 
.43 .49 0.00  1.00 
TIMB-LINK Tie (family or friend) to Timber industryc  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
FOR_VIS Number of visits to forest in past year 2.19 5.37 0.00 60.00 
RURAL Coming from a rural area .17 .38 0.00 1.00 
AGE Age in years 20.57 1.26 18.00 26.00 
FEMALE = 1 if female, = 0 otherwise .54 .50 0.00 1.00 
INCOME Annual household income (at 18 levels) 7.66 7.21 0.00 17.00 
S25 Damaged estimates  related to the first 
quartile risk estimate 
0.33 .47 0.00 1.00 
S50 Damaged estimates  related to the 
Median risk estimate 
0.33 .47 0 1.00 
S75 Damaged estimates  related to the 
Second quartile risk estimate 
0.33 .47 0 1.00 
Tpu-nocc First experimental treatment 0.15 0.35 0 1.00 
Tpr-nocc Second experimental treatment 0.16 0.37 0 1.00 
Tpu-cc Third experimental treatment 0.13 0.33 0 1.00 
Tpr-cc Fourth experimental treatment 0.19 0.39 0 1.00 
Tpu Fifth experimental treatment 0.18 0.38 0 1.00 
Tpr Sixth experimental treatment 0.18 0.38 0 1.00 
a
 Expressed in percentage, b From 0=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree, c  From 0=not tied to 
timber industry to 1=tied to timber industry, d From 0=annual household income less than $10,000 
to 17=annual household income greater than $125,000                         
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Table 12 Regression results of Model 1, 2, and 3 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Estimation 
procedure: 
OLS with robust 
stand. err. and 
clustering  
OLS with robust stand. 
err. and clustering 
GLM with binomial 
fam. func. and 
logistic link func. 
Dependent 
Variable:  
arcsin√%DAM log [%DAM/(1-%DAM)] %DAM 
RISK_PR -.1433* ** -1.2570* ** -1.0106* ** 
AMB .1259* ** .7139* ** .6030* ** 
GW_PAST .0042* ** .0943* ** .0441* ** 
GW_FUT -.0015* ** -.0907* ** . -.0285* ** 
AC_KN .0260* ** .1538* ** .1532* ** 
MC_KN .0204* ** .2380* ** .1394* ** 
TIMB_LINK -.0710* ** -.7577* ** -.4842* ** 
FOR_VIS -.0017* ** -.0160* ** -.0153* ** 
RURAL .0647* ** .5371* ** .4041* ** 
AGE -.0025* ** -.0238* ** -.0197* ** 
FEMALE -.0332* ** -.2634* ** -.2515* ** 
INCOME .0018* ** .0177* ** .0115* ** 
Prob_S50 .0456* ** .3975* ** .2571* ** 
Prob_S75 .0831* ** .7661* ** .4777* ** 
Tpu-nocc .1346* ** .9950* ** .7069* ** 
Tpr-nocc .1040* ** .7695* ** .5810* ** 
Tpu-cc .1937* ** 1.5153* ** 1.1245* ** 
Tpr-cc .1597* ** 1.1892* ** .9069* ** 
Tpu .0815* ** .7122* ** .5201* ** 
Cons. .4673* ** -1.0511* ** -.6534* ** 
F    15.0300* **    10.6200* ** -*** 
R-squared .2277*** .2253*** -*** 
Log P.Likel.  -*** -*** -226.83*** 
* p < .01, ** p < .05, *** p < .10  
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Table 13 Responses on key explanatory variables 
Treatment 
Group 
Degree of familiarity with the pine beetle risk issue: Percentage of treatment 
group responding in category c 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Pu-nocca 88 8 4 0 0 
2 Pri-nocca 93 4 4 0 0 
3 Pu-cca 85 10 5 0 0 
4 Pr-cca 91 6 3 0 0 
5 Pub 74 20 6 0 0 
6 Prb 74 20 6 0 0 
 Agreement with the statement that Climate Change will Happen in the Future: 
Percentage of group responding in category d 
 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Pu-cca 0 33 24 33 10 
4 Pr-cca 9 19 22 34 16 
 Percentage of Group with Private Forest Connection; Percentage Who Use Public 
Forests, and Average Number of recreational visits to Public Forests (last year) 
 Private Forest 
Connection 
Public Forest 
Users 
Average Recreational 
Visits 
1 Pu-nocca 0 71 2 
2 Pri-nocca 7 56 6 
3 Pu-cca 0 57 3 
4 Pr-cca 6 68 2 
5 Pub 6 70 4 
6 Prb 6 70 4 
a
 Between-subjects analysis 
b
 Within-subjects analysis 
c  From 1=not familiar at all to 5=very familiar 
d  From 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree 
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Figure 1: The experimental structure of the Exchangeability Method 
Figure 2: The first binary question of the Exchangeability Method (screenshot)  
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Figure 3: Average subjective risk estimates of the pine beetle infestation rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4a: Boxplot of variable S25  
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Figure 4b: Boxplot of variable S50  
 
Figure 5c: Boxplot of variable S75  
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Appendix A: Laboratory Instruction Text 
Informed Consent Statement 
 
You are being asked to participate in an Economics Experiment that will explore how 
individuals make decisions when outcomes cannot be known with certainty.  The 
experiment will last approximately 75 minutes. You will possibly earn money based upon 
the choices you make in this experiment. You may ask questions at any time during the 
experiment.  If after the experiment is complete you have additional questions, please 
contact Dr. W. Douglass Shaw at wdshaw@tamu.edu or 979-845-3555.  Your 
participation in this experiment is voluntary; your refusal to participate or discontinue 
participation will involve no penalty or loss of the benefits that you are entitled.  By 
completing the questionnaire and experiment, you have expressed your willingness to 
participate.   
 
Following the Informed consent, I will present each subject with the Subject’s Bill of 
Rights. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECT'S BILL OF RIGHTS: The rights below are the rights 
of every person who is asked to be in a research study. 
 
As an experimental subject, I have the following rights: 
1. To be told what the study is trying to find out. 
2. To be told what will happen to me and whether any of the procedures, 
drugs, or devices are different from what would be used in standard 
practice. 
3. To be told about the frequent and / or important risks, side effects or 
discomforts of the things that will happen to me for research purposes. 
4. To be told if I can expect any benefit from participating and, if so, what 
that benefit might be. 
5. To be told what other choices I might have and how they may be better 
or worse than being in the study. 
6. To be allowed to ask any questions concerning the study both before 
agreeing to be involved and during the course of the study. 
7. To be told what sort of medical treatment is available if any 
complications arise. 
8. To refuse to participate at all or to change my mind about participating 
after the study is started.  
9. To receive a copy of the signed and dated consent form. 
10. To be free of any pressure when considering whether I wish to agree to 
be in the study. 
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Section A: Getting Started 
 
I am Dr. X and helping me with the experiment today will be several assistants. All of us 
are in economics or agricultural economics.  
 
Each of you is now seated at a computer terminal where you will enter responses to the 
questions. Please do not look at anyone else’s responses, and do not discuss your 
responses with others. 
 
You will be asked to complete several tasks, taking a maximum of about 75 minutes. As 
you know, you will receive a participation fee of $10 as a way of showing our thanks for 
you being here, and giving up some time today.  
 
Your Chance of additional earnings 
 
Several of the questions also involve your making a choice that involves a potential 
payment. These choices involve a chance that an outcome will occur. At the end of the 
experiment we will randomly choose two subjects (there are about 25 subjects here 
today) from all of you is this section. We will do so by giving you an identification 
number that corresponds to your computer terminal number and  letting one of you 
choose from a bag with numbered chips. If your number is drawn, you will be selected. 
 
After that selection, we will randomly choose 4 tasks that the two selected subjects have 
answered (each of you has around 12 choices to answer). We will do so by giving to each 
task an identification number and letting one of you choose from a bag with numbered 
chips.  
 
Finally, we will next flip a coin to determine the outcome for the questions that the two 
selected subjects have answered. If their choice corresponds to the “winning” outcome, 
the subject will be paid the amount corresponding to that question. If the choice 
corresponds to a “losing” outcome, based on the coin toss, then you earn nothing for that 
task. 
 
You have the potential to earn between $0 and $200 based on the choices you make in 
addition to the participation fee of $10 that you will receive.    
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The choices that you make involve the potential risk of the Southern Pine Beetle pest in 
harming Texas pine forests. To begin, we would like to ask you about your thoughts 
about this pest (the Southern Pine Beetle) and the chance of pests invading and 
eliminating a percentage of a forest with 10,000 trees during the period 2010-2050. If you 
have no ideas or knowledge about these things, that is perfectly ok. 
 
A1. On a scale from 1 to 5, how familiar are you with the Southern Pine Beetle? (mark 
the best number) 
 
          □ 1                □ 2                               □ 3                       □ 4                    □ 5 
Not at all familiar          I have heard of it         I know a bit         I am very familiar with it 
 
 
A2. If you are willing to provide an estimate, what would you say the risk, or the chance 
is, of the Southern Pine Beetle eliminating 10% of the trees in a forest with 10,000 trees, 
like that red shaded area in the map below, during the period 2010-2050? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Chance 0%                         __________%                   100% It will definitely happen 
 
 
A3. Answer below only if you are unable to answer A2. If you are not willing to provide 
an estimate, would you be willing to provide a range, say between the smallest chance it 
will happen, up to the highest chance it could happen? 
 
   No 
   Yes       ________% - ________% (enter your range, for example, 5% to 50%)  
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SECTION B Pests and Risks to Forests10 
 
The Southern Pine Beetle is an insect that thrives on pine trees, but unfortunately kills 
these trees by getting inside them. Texas has several stands of pine trees (12,000,000 
acres), located on both private and public land. For example, see the map below. 
 
The Southern Pine Beetle has already killed 1,2850,000 cords of pine pulpwood and 
about 1,540,000 Mbf (1,000 board feet) of pine saw-timber in Texas during the period 
1960-2009. It is thought that the Southern Pine Beetle dies when very cold temperatures 
are reached, and that it thrives when warm and dry climatic conditions happen.      
 
Now, consider a publically accessible pine forest with 10,000 trees. You can enjoy this 
forest any time you want for your recreational activities (hiking, jogging, doing picnic, 
etc.) without paying any entrance fee. This forest is not actually threatened by the 
southern pine beetle right now, but there is a chance that the southern pine beetle may 
damage and kill a percentage of trees of this forest in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This is the laboratory instruction text for the treatment “Public-climate change”. 
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The choices that you make involve the percentage of the trees of this public pine forest 
that you believe could be damaged and killed by the southern pine beetle in the period 
from 2010 to 2050 assuming that no pest control and no killed plant replacement will be 
implemented. In each question, you have to bet a certain amount of US $ (as an example, 
$50) choosing between two potential outcomes: 
 
EXAMPLE 
 
Outcome a. I believe the percentage of damaged and killed pine trees will be greater than 
or equal to 0% and less than or equal to 50% in a forest with 10,000 trees in the period 
2011-2050.     
 
 
Outcome b. I believe the percentage of damaged and killed pine trees will be strictly 
greater than 50% and smaller than or equal to 100% in a forest with 10,000 trees in the 
period 2011-2050. 
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The occurrence of one of the two potential outcomes will be determined at the conclusion 
of the experiment by tossing a coin. Outcome a will be associated with a head, while 
Outcome b will be associated with tail.  
 
If you choose to bet $50 on the fact that the percentage value of damaged and killed pine 
trees will be greater than or equal to 0% and less than or equal to 50% in a forest with 
10,000 trees in the period 2011-2050 (Outcome a) and if the outcome of coin toss is 
head you will earn $50 if both the ID number of this particular question and your ID 
number will be selected, otherwise you will earn nothing. 
 
Your goal will be to take home as much in extra earnings as you can. Your earnings will 
be determined by the choice you make in each task and by the outcome of coin toss. 
For each question below, we would like you to express your opinion on the occurrence of 
two ranges of outcomes, each total range with the same likelihood of occurrence. You 
will be asked to state which of two outcome range contains the percentage of damaged 
trees you think is most likely to happen. If that event happens, after we play out the 
outcome, you might receive a certain monetary payment, for example, $50, but if that 
event does not happen you receive nothing, but you will not lose any money either. 
 
Ok, let’s begin now with your tasks. Choose which you would prefer below. 
 
 
 
EXCHANGEABILITY GAME (see Figure 2) 
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SECTION C: Debriefing and Questions About You 
 
C1. Do you or any relative or friend have past or current experience in the forest or 
timber industry? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
 
C2. Have you ever visited a Texas forest for any purpose? 
 
  No 
  Yes  __________________________________ (enter the name of it, if you can recall) 
 
 
C3. Have you ever seat in a lecture, seminar or conference about climate change and pest 
on agriculture and forestry? 
 
  No 
  Yes  _________________________________  (enter the number of times, if you can                             
recall) 
 
C4. Have you ever watched a scientific TV program or read a scientific article about 
climate change and pest on agriculture and forestry? 
 
  No 
  Yes  _________________________________  (enter the number of times, if you can                             
recall) 
 
C5. On a scale of 1 to 5, how familiar are you with the topic of global warming? (mark 
number) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
Not at all 
familiar 
 Very familiar 
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For the questions below, on a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate your level of 
disagreement with the following statements (mark the best number to express your view): 
 
C6. Scientists have demonstrated that global warming is already happening. 
 
 
 
C7. Scientists have demonstrated that global warming will definitely happen in the future. 
 
 
 
C8. Scientists have demonstrated that global warming is caused at least in part by humans 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 
 
 
 
C9. At least some forests in the state of Texas should be open to the public so that all can 
enjoy forest-based recreation, such as hiking, camping, hunting, and swimming (if a lake 
is in the forest). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
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Questions About YOU  (We respect your privacy, and we will not match your 
responses with your name, nor make any attempt to identify you. Your responses 
can often explain why people answer certain questions in different ways) 
 
C10. What is your current age? ___________ 
 
 
C11. What is your gender?   (mark)       □ M          □ F 
 
 
C12. How long have you lived in the state of Texas?  __________ years 
 
 
C13. Do you come from a rural area or farm? 
 
  No          Yes 
 
 
 
C14. Have you, or do you ever do forest-based recreation in the outdoors? 
 
  No 
  Yes     number of trips ____________    years_________  (enter the approximate 
number of recreational trips per year you took last year, or in the most recent 
year you took a trip 
 
 
C15. Income often affects people’s preferences for risk, so we need to ask this question. 
What is your approximate personal annual income including all sources? If you are a 
student, completely or partially dependent on parents for support, and know the category 
for your parent’s household, please circle that category. (mark appropriate category) 
 
□     Under $10,000 
□     $10,000 to $14,999 
□     $15,000 to $19,999 
□     $20,000 to $24,999 
□     $25,000 to 29,999 
□     $30,000 to 34,999 
□     $35,000 to 39,999 
□     $40,000 to 44,999 
□     $45,000 to 49,999 
□     $50,000 to $54,999 
□     $55,000 to $59,999 
□     $60,000 to $69,999 
□     $70,000 to $79,999 
□     $80,000 to $89,999 
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□     $90,000 to $99,999 
□     $100,000 to $114,999 
□     $115,000 to $125,000 
□     Over $125,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
